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I. INTRODUCTION 
President Donald Trump’s strict immigration policies display the need 
to evaluate the country’s judiciary proceedings on immigration. How exactly 
do immigration courts function compared to civil or criminal court 
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procedures? In short, the immigration courts are controlled by the executive 
branch of the United States government. 
This note functions as a call to Congress to develop legislation that 
would make the immigration court system into an independent Article I 
court. The current system is broken, and it is time for the immigration 
courts to become an independent Article I court to eliminate unjust 
decisions based on policy rather than the merits of the case. In the past, 
Congress has created several Article I courts using its constitutional power 
with examples being the tax and bankruptcy courts.1 Additionally, the 
Federal Bar Association has drafted proposed legislation to create an Article 
I immigration court because there is a consensus that the current 
immigration court system is broken.2 We have reached the tipping point. 
Immigration proceedings should not be determined by the Attorney 
General without due process. This note begins by providing the historical 
background of immigration adjudication dating back to the Immigration Act 
of 1891, when the United States immigration court system was enacted by 
                                                           
* Daniel R. Buteyn, J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2022; B.A. English, 
University of Kansas, 2015. I would like to thank my sister, Cassondre Buteyn, and my 
brother-in-law, David Wilson—both successful immigration attorneys and William Mitchell 
alumni—for being my mentors and helping me with this fantastic topic selection. I would also 
like to thank Professor Steve Aggergaard for his wisdom and guidance throughout the writing 
process. Finally, I would like to thank my family—especially my wife, Julia Buteyn—for their 
constant love and support throughout my time in law school. 
1 The Federal Judicial Center distinguishes between Article I and Article III judges: 
Operating under its Article I, section 8 power to “constitute” federal tribunals, 
Congress has created several courts staffed by judges holding these protections 
who exercise the “judicial power” contemplated in Article III. These courts are 
commonly known as “Article III” or “constitutional” courts. The latter moniker 
can be confusing, as the Constitution does not oblige Congress to create any 
particular court and such courts routinely hear non-constitutional disputes. 
. . . 
Since the earliest days of the republic, Congress has also created separate 
“Article I” or “legislative” courts. Again, the nomenclature can be confusing as 
Article I does not specifically authorize these courts and they do not “legislate” 
in any traditional sense of the word. These courts range from independent 
federal tribunals staffed with judges who are not subject to the tenure and salary 
protection of Article III . . . Unlike other Article I judges (including bankruptcy, 
territorial and magistrate judges), for example, they are not administered by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts or governed by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. 
Courts: A Brief Overview, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/courts-brief-overview [https://perma.cc/7DTK-Y68N]. 
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Congress.3 The relevant history is outlined up to today’s laws, noting any 
relevant changes to immigration adjudication. The history provides details 
on how the executive branch, specifically the role of the attorney general 
gained power. 
Section III discusses the differences between federal and state judges 
compared to immigration judges.4 Federal and state judges do not face the 
same pressures from the executive branch that immigration judges face.5 
This section also compares the similarities and differences between 
immigration trials and criminal and civil trials.6 
Section IV discusses separation of powers and, specifically, how the 
executive branch’s control of the immigration courts has created an unfair 
shift of power and an imbalance between the branches of the government.7 
To further increase the power of the executive branch, President Trump 
recently attempted to strip certain immigration judges of their right to 
unionize (or union bust)by targeting judges that do not share his views on 
immigration in general and removal proceedings, in particular.8 This section 
moves to the issues involved with former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ 
unprecedented and increased use of self-certification to direct the Board of 
Immigration Appeal to refer cases to the attorney general for review.9 This 
section will review four specific instances in which former Attorney General 
Sessions exercised this power.10 
Section V discusses how this increase of power creates separation of 
powers issues among the three branches of the United States government.11 
The power to determine immigration cases oversteps the executive branch’s 
bounds by entering into unconstitutional territory.12 
Section VI provides recommendations and a firm call to action for 
immigration courts to become Article I courts13 and therefore, out of the 
reach of the President’s influence on immigration judges to rule on cases in 
accordance with his policy goals.14 The final section summarizes that it is 
                                                           
3 Infra Section II.A. Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, THE 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/evolution-pre-1983 
[https://perma.cc/F6H5-R5YV]. 
4 See infra Section III.A.   
5 See infra Section III.B. 
6 See infra Section III.B. 
7 See infra Part IV.    
8 See infra Section IV.A. 
9 See infra Section IV.B. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra Section V.A. 
12 See infra Section III.B. 
13 See infra Section VI.A. 
14 See infra Section VI.B. 
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time to put an end to the executive branch turning its back on asylum 
seekers.15 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 
A. The Immigration Act of 1891 
 Since President Donald Trump took office on January 20, 2017, 
immigration law has increasingly become more of a hot-button issue in the 
United States.16 In order to evaluate the controversy surrounding 
immigration issues today, it is helpful to look back at the history of 
immigration adjudication. The United States immigration court system 
dates back to when Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1891,17 which 
was the first law that placed immigration under federal control.18 Prior to the 
Immigration Act of 1891, individual states were responsible for enacting and 
enforcing their respective immigration laws.19 Congress passed the Act in an 
effort to increase border security and immigration enforcement in the 
United States.20 The Act states, in part: 
That the office of superintendent of immigration is hereby created and 
established, and the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, is authorized and directed to appoint such officer . . . The 
superintendent shall be an officer in the Treasury Department under the 
control and supervision of the Secretary of Treasury . . . .21 
By creating the Office of Immigration within the Department of 
Treasury, Congress placed enforcement of immigration law directly under 
the federal government’s control; however, that was just the beginning. The 
Act also gave sole authority and discretion to inspection officers to examine 
and remove aliens wanting to enter the United States.22 This trend of 
                                                           
15 See infra Part VII. 
16 Presidents, Vice Presidents, & Coinciding Sessions of Congress, HISTORY, ART & 
ARCHIVES UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidents-Coinciding/Presidents-Coinciding/ 
[https://perma.cc/RAH3-5XPJ]. 
17 Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3. 
18 Id. 




21 26 STAT. 1085, 51 CONG. CH. 551 (1891). 
22 The act outlines the inspecting officer’s duty upon any immigrant’s arrival: 
That upon the arrival by water at any place within the United States of any alien immigrants 
it shall be the duty of the commanding officer and the agents of the steam or sailing vessel by 
4
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broadening the discretionary powers of inspection officers continues as 
immigration adjudication becomes more prevalent today.23 
B. The Immigration Act of 1893 
 During the 1890s, wide-spread declining wages and economic 
concerns had created discontent among American citizens who blamed the 
recent wave of immigrants for the nation’s financial concerns.24 Just two 
years after the Immigration Act of 1891, Congress enacted a new law to 
further empower inspection officers.25 The new Act of 1893 went as far as 
to invoke a “duty” on each inspection officer to question and detain “every 
person who may not appear to him to be clearly and beyond doubt entitled 
to admission.”26 When an individual was detained for “special inquiry,” four 
inspection officers designated by the Secretary of Treasury or the 
                                                           
which they came to report the name, nationality, last residence, and destination of every such 
alien, before any of them are landed, to the proper inspection officers, who shall thereupon 
go or send competent assistants on board such vessel and there inspect all such aliens, or the 
inspection officers may order a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a 
designated time and place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection is 
made. 
Id. (explaining how inspection officers may order removal of individuals and “detain them 
until a thorough inspection is made”). 
23 The U.S. Immigration Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-debate-0 [https://perma.cc/LK7U-
WELT]. Immigrants account for nearly 14 percent of the current U.S. population, which 
equates to around 44 million people. Id.  
 
24 See Chinese Exclusion Act, HISTORY.COM, 
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/chinese-exclusion-act-1882 
[https://perma.cc/8Z8C-28TA]; 27 STAT. 25, 52 CONG. CH. 60 (1892) (restricting 
immigration into the United States in an effort to mitigate declining wages). 
25 27 STAT. 569, 52 CONG. CH. 206 (1893). 
26 Section 5 of the Act is quoted in full: 
That it shall be the duty of every inspector of arriving alien immigrants to detain 
for a special inquiry, under section one of the immigration act of March third, 
eighteen hundred and ninety-one, every person who may not appear to him to 
be clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission, and all special inquiries shall 
be conducted by not less than four officials acting as inspectors, to be designated 
in writing by the Secretary of the Treasury or the superintendent of immigration, 
for conducting special inquiries; and no immigrant shall be admitted upon 
special inquiry except after a favorable decisions made by at least three of said 
inspectors; and any decision to admit shall be subject to appeal by any dissenting 
inspector to the superintendent of immigration, whose action shall be subject to 
review by the Secretary of the Treasury, provided in section eight of said 
immigration act of March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one. 
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Superintendent of Immigration would conduct the investigation.27 In order 
for an individual to be successfully admitted to the United States after a 
“special inquiry,” they would need the approval of at least three inspecting 
officers.28 Furthermore, any favorable decision to admit an individual would 
automatically be subject to an appeal by any dissenting inspection officer to 
the Secretary of the Treasury.29 
 The Immigration Act of 1893 created additional hurdles for those 
immigrating to the United States. Developing a process of “special inquiry,” 
where appearances can be the basis of whether or not to detain an individual 
or family, is a wholly subjective approach. Immigration officers were given 
the power to decide admittance, and if admittance was granted, the 
dissenting officer could appeal to the Superintendent of Immigration 
“whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of Treasury.”30 
Ultimately, the decisions of the immigration officers, the Superintendent, 
and the Secretary of Treasury all culminated into a determination on the 
subjectivity of immigration decisions. 
C. Significant Changes to Immigration Adjudication up to 1983 
 Congress enacted significant changes to immigration policies at the 
start of the twentieth century.31 Immigration responsibilities shifted to the 
Department of Labor (DOL), and the Immigration Act of 191732 codified 
and expanded deportation provisions.33 With the combination of nativist34 
tendencies and the economic concerns following the Industrial Revolution, 
Congress looked to further limit access to the United States.35 Congress 
enacted the Immigration Act of 1921,36 creating the National Origins Quota 





31 29 STAT. 874, 64 CONG. CH. 29 (1917); 42 STAT. 5, 67 CONG. CH. 8 (1921). 
32 29 STAT. 874, 64 CONG. CH. 29 (1917). 
33 Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3. 
34 Nativism is the policy of favoring native inhabitants over immigrants. Nativism, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER. 
35 Robbie Clark, Note, Reaffirming the Role of the Federal Courts: How the Sixties Provide 
Guidance for Immigration Reform, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 463, 470 
(2011). 
36 The act states, in part: 
That the number of aliens of any nationality who may be admitted under the 
immigration laws to the United States in any fiscal year shall be limited to 3 per 
centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in 
the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910. 
42 STAT. 5, 67 CONG. CH. 8 (1921). 
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System which limited the number of immigrants into the United States by 
assigning a quota to each nationality.37 The quota system was designed to 
maintain ethnic homogeneity in the United States by limiting the number of 
visas awarded to natives of a particular nation—most notably controlling the 
number of Asian immigrants.38 Congress, as a means of rationalizing such 
blatant racial discrimination, pointed to the decreased need for cheap labor 
sources as a way to severely limit immigration from countries outside of 
Northern Europe..39 The act temporarily shifted power to the Secretary of 
Labor, who created a Board of Review to evaluate appeals and make 
recommendations to the Secretary of Labor, although the power would 
eventually shift back to the Attorney General.40 
 In 1940, immigration matters moved from the DOL to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) where the Attorney General regained decision 
powers.41 The Board of Review was renamed the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, and sole responsibility was conferred to the Attorney General.42 
Previously, the Board of Review was able to make recommendations 
regarding immigration case appeals, but the newly created Board of 
Immigration Appeals was authorized to decide immigration case appeals on 
behalf of the Attorney General.43 Immigrants wanting to appeal their cases 
were once again at the mercy of the political goals of the Attorney General 
and executive branch. 
 In 1952, Congress reorganized and modified existing immigrations 
laws into one body of text—the Immigration and Nationality Act.44 They also 
                                                           
37 Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3. 
38 Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C.L. REV. 273, 279–81 (1996). 
39 Clark, supra note 35 at 470–71. 
40 Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3. 
41 Id. 
42 Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3,502, 3,503 
(Sept. 4, 1940) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 90.1–.2). 
43 The Board of Immigration Appeals has authority: 
(a) To issue orders of deportation after proceedings in accordance with law and 
regulations; to order the cancellation of warrants of arrest issued in such 
proceedings; and in connection therewith to exercise such of the discretion 
conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropriate to the disposition 
of deportation proceedings; 
(b) To consider and determine appeals from decisions of boards of special 
inquiry in exclusion or pre-examination cases, and to exercise such of the 
discretion conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropriate to the 
disposition of such appeals . . . 
Id. (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 90.3). 
44 Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3. 
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eliminated the Special Inquiry Boards and, instead, appointed special 
inquiry officers to decide deportation cases.45 The statute lays out the 
definition and responsibilities of these officers: 
The term “special inquiry officer” means any immigration officer who 
the Attorney General deems specially qualified to conduct specified classes 
of proceedings, in whole or in part, required by this Act to be conducted by 
or before a special inquiry officer and who is designated and selected by the 
Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to conduct such 
proceedings. Such special inquiry officer shall be subject to such supervision 
and shall perform such duties, not inconsistent with this Act, as the Attorney 
General shall prescribe.46 
Indeed, the Attorney General decides who qualifies to conduct these 
important proceedings. The special inquiry officers “shall perform such 
duties . . . as the Attorney General shall prescribe.”47 The officers perform 
their duties with the intention of satisfying the Attorney General’s ultimate 
goals—political or otherwise. The Immigration and Nationality Act 
essentially established the first set of immigration judges that were not part 
of the judicial branch of the United States government. This trend continues 
in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 By 1973, regulations authorized special inquiry officers to adopt the 
title of “immigration judges” and to wear judicial robes.48 Special inquiry 
officers were already conducting hearings as if they were judges, but the 
regulation made the title of “immigration judges” official. Immigration 
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals would remain this way until 
the DOJ created an entirely new agency in 1983.49 
D. The Creation of a New Agency 
 In an effort “to improve the management, direction and control of 
the immigration judicial review programs,” the Attorney General created 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in 1983.50 Still within 
                                                           
45 66 STAT. 163, 82 CONG. CH. 477 § 242(b) (1952). 
46 Id. at § 101(b)(4). 
47 Id.  
48 “The term ‘immigration judge’ means special inquiry officer and may be used 
interchangeably with the term special inquiry officer whenever it appears in this chapter.” 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, 38 Fed. Reg. 8,590, 8,590 
(April 4, 1973) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1.1). 
49 Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3. 
50 Immigration and Naturalization Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,038 (Feb. 25, 1983) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. Part 1). 
A report titled The Attorney General’s Judges, How the U.S. Immigration 
Courts Became a Deportation Tool provides a background of the creation of 
8
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the DOJ and under supervision of the Attorney General, the EOIR sought 
to consolidate “similar quasi-judicial functions within a similar organization 
and will result in a more effective and efficient operation of the 
Department’s immigration judicial review programs.”51 
 The EOIR has only gained authority since its creation. Following the 
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which 
largely made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire an unauthorized 
immigrant,52new immigration issues began to arise. In 1987, within the 
EOIR, regulations were implemented to authorize the Office of the Chief 
Administrative Officer to decide cases related to illegal hiring, employment 
sanctions, and unfair immigration-related employment practices.53 
 Most importantly—and for purposes of this note—the EOIR 
adjudicates removal proceedings for aliens and their families.54 In order for 
an alien to be removed, it must be established “by clear and convincing 
evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United 
States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability shall be valid 
unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.”55 
 On the outset, this statute sounds just because it guarantees the alien 
cannot be deported without cause—the case must be based on “reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence.”56 However, the issue remains that the 
EOIR and immigration judges are products of the Attorney General, so 
“reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” become much more 
subjective. Importantly, the Attorney General is appointed by the 
                                                           
the EOIR: “Its development was a reaction to widespread critiques that the pre-
existing system was under-resourced, overburdened, violative of procedural 
rights, and embedded in an enforcement-driven context. However, despite 
broad agreement on the need for systemic reform, Congress did not pass 
legislation to improve the immigration court structure.” Instead, the EOIR was 
created “by regulation.”  
The Attorney General’s Judges, How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation 
Tool, SPLC SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 7 (June 2019), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_policyreport_the_attorney_generals_judge
s_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C2N-YKLH] [hereinafter The Attorney General’s Judges]. 
51 Immigration and Naturalization Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,039 (Feb. 25, 1983) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. Part 1). 
52 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274A(a)(1)(A), 100 
Stat. 3,359, 3,360 (1986). 
53 Organization of the Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Matters, 52 
Fed. Reg. 44,971, 44,971 (Nov. 24, 1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 0). 
54 “At the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien 
is removable from the United States. The determination of the immigration judge shall be 
based only on the evidence produced at the hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2019). 
55 Id. at (1)(A). 
56 Id. 
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President57 and is privy to his political and policy leanings. “Reasonable, 
substantial, and probative” can be interpreted in a way that disfavors aliens 
and their families—all to satisfy the desires of the Attorney General and the 
President of the United States. 
Federal and state judges, on the other hand, do not have the same type 
of political pressure. Even though federal judges are elected, they do not 
face the same type of scrutiny as immigration judges, who have the Attorney 
General breathing down their necks. As this note explores in the next 
section, there are vast differences between federal and state judges and 
immigration judges. 
III. JUDICIARY COMPARISONS 
A. Federal and State Judges 
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct regulates the conduct of federal 
and state judges in the United States; the Code states that “[a] judge shall 
uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”58 
If a judge does not uphold the standard according to the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, they are subject to discipline handed down by the 
American Bar Association (ABA). If a judge violates the Model Rules and 
receives a complaint, it is mandated that “[a] judge shall cooperate and be 
candid and honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies.”59 
The Model Code and the ABA regulate the rules judges must follow. 
Judges have a moral obligation to rule on cases in an impartial way “that 
promotes public confidence in the . . . judiciary.”60 Further, “[a] judge shall 
not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or 
relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”61 The 
comment to Rule 2.4 describes this obligation in detail: 
[1] An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases 
according to the law and facts, without regard to whether 
particular laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the 
public, the media, government officials, or the judge’s friends or 
family. Confidence in the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision 
                                                           
57 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1966). 
58 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANNON 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
59 Id. at r. 2.16(A) (2014). 
60 Id. at r. 1.2 (2014). 
61 Id. at r. 2.4(B) (2014). 
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making is perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside 
influences.62 
Judges cannot make rulings based on influences from anyone and, 
relevant for this note, certainly cannot decide cases with influence from 
“government officials.”63 
Immigration judges, on the other hand, are at the mercy of the 
executive branch and can be pressured to rule in a way that aligns with the 
political views of the President. The creation of the EOIR was intended to 
“increase judicial independence and remove the appearance of 
prosecutorial bias”; however, these goals have not been accomplished due 
to the Attorney General’s overbearing control and overbroad discretionary 
powers.64 Of course, not all immigration judges are influenced in this way. 
This note is not an attempt to unfairly criticize immigration judges; rather, 
this note aims to aid the hard-working immigration judges in the United 
States by persuading Congress that immigration adjudication does not 
belong in the executive branch due to the obvious separation of powers 
issue. Immigration judges are currently limited in their opportunities to rule 
in a way that is fair to all. 
Further, immigration judges and state and federal judges are defined 
differently because immigration judges are not appointed powers from the 
U.S. Constitution.65 When compared to the better-known procedures of 
state and federal courts, it is clear that immigration judges have difficulties 
remaining impartial.  
                                                           
62 Id. at r. 2.4 cmt. 1 (2014). 
63 Id. 
64 The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 7. The Innovation Law Lab & Southern 
Poverty Law Center report discusses the overbearing control of the Attorney General: 
From the outset, the attorney general’s control over the EOIR has undermined 
its independence by exposing immigration judges to prosecutorial and political 
pressures. The Department of Justice is, after all, the nation’s leading prosecutor 
and law enforcement agency. It is not, by its very nature, a judicial agency. By 
keeping the immigration adjudication function inside the Department of Justice, 
the attorney general kept the EOIR under his unitary control. 
Id.  
65 Id.  
Immigration judge’s . . . authority does not derive from Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, which established the judicial branch. Immigration judges are not 
even ‘administrative law judges,’ whose authority derives from Article I of the 
Constitution and who conduct proceedings under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. . . [I]mmigration judges are the attorney general’s attorneys who decide 
immigration claims of individuals the government is trying to deport. 
Id.  
11
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B. Comparison of Immigration Trials and Criminal Trials 
 1. Immigration Trials Generally 
 There are different circumstances that lead people to immigration 
court: refugees forced to flee their countries can apply for asylum in the 
United States;66 people on the verge of deportation may request 
“cancellation of removal” allowing them to stay in the country;67 and others 
may be pursuing citizenship. 
                                                           
66 “Refugee” is defined in the statute: 
The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion. . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2019). 
67 The statute first provides ways in which a permanent resident may be granted a cancellation 
of removal: 
(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents. The Attorney 
General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or 
deportable from the United States if the alien— 
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 
5 years, 
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been 
admitted in any status, and 
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
Section (b) goes provides instances when cancellation of removal may be granted for 
nonpermanent residents: 
(b) Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent 
residents. 
(1) In general. The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the 
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is 
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien— 
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of 
not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; 
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; 
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 
237(a)(3) [8 USCS § 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)], subject to paragraph 
(5); and 
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United 
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
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These types of cases will be heard by one of the approximately 400 
immigration judges in one of the sixty-three immigration courts in the 
United States.68 In August 2019, there were over one million pending 
immigration cases, which equates to 2,500 cases per judge.69 This backlog of 
cases is an unrealistic amount of work for just 400 immigration judges; there 
are simply too many cases to be heard and not enough time to hear them. 
Such delays can be construed as a violation of the judicial process that 
immigrants are due.70 
In her article outlining how immigration courts work, Fatma Marouf, 
Professor of Law at Texas A&M University, compares immigration 
proceedings with criminal trials; however, she makes some important 
distinctions.71 Immigrants, for example, do not enjoy the same Sixth 
Amendment72 constitutional protections as a criminal defendant.73 Though 
immigrants are not entitled to a court-appointed attorney, they are permitted 
to hire or accept one via pro-bono services.74 
Immigrants who have been convicted of a crime are subject to 
mandatory detention during their hearings.75 Marouf provides that convicted 
                                                           
68 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/SMH6-
2KQR]. 
69 Judge Ashley Tabaddor, president of the National Association of Immigration Judges 
states: “If nothing else, the continuing rise of the backlog shows that the immigration court is 
broken . . . . Until we fix the design defect of having a court in a law enforcement agency, we 
will not be able to address the backlog in a fair and effective manner.” Priscilla Alvarez, 
Immigration court backlog exceeds 1 million cases, data group says, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/18/politics/immigration-court-backlog/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/933K-8QEH].  
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Courts have consistently held that immigrants are protected 
by the Constitution’s right to due process. 
 
71 Fatma Marouf, How immigration court works, THE CONVERSATION, 
https://theconversation.com/how-immigration-court-works-98678 [https://perma.cc/RH8R-
3RFN]. 
72 The Sixth Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
73 Marouf, supra note 71. 
74 Marouf, supra note 71. 
75 The statute lists the circumstances when an alien faces mandatory detention: 
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immigrants “are often brought into the courtroom wearing a jumpsuit and 
shackles” even if they only committed a low-level offense.76 Furthermore, an 
overwhelming majority of them have no choice but to appear without a 
lawyer.77 
 2. Trial Comparisons 
Immigration trials lack additional constitutional defenses required in 
criminal trials beyond just the Sixth Amendment. To reiterate, immigration 
judges are part of the DOJ, which is overseen by the Attorney General. 
Additionally, it is relevant to discuss immigration trial prosecutors. These 
prosecutors are attorneys hired by the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement—an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—
to represent the United States government.78 The political goals of the DOJ 
and DHS are certainly of the same flavor because both departments are run 
by the executive branch.79 Both departments are part of what the White 
House refers to as “the Cabinet”—“an advisory body made up of the heads 
of the 15 executive departments. Appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate, the members of the Cabinet are often the President’s closest 
confidants.”80 
The political views of immigration judges and prosecutors of 
immigration cases are of the same vein, which will undoubtedly yield unjust 
results for immigrants being tried. In a federal trial, judges are part of an 
independent judiciary, which is an entirely separate branch of the United 
                                                           
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who— 
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in 
section 1182(a)(2) of this title, 
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, 
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an 
offense for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of at 
least 1 year, or 
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under 
section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, 
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on 
parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien 
may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense. 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2019). 
76 Marouf, supra note 71. 
77 Marouf, supra note 71. 
78 Marouf, supra note 71. 
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States government.81 There is a deliberate separation of powers between the 
three branches of government that is the backbone of the United States 
Constitution and was implemented as so to avoid tyranny and too much 
power for one particular branch.82 In the Federalist Papers No. 51, James 
Madison writes that “the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several 
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the 
private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.”83 
The separation of powers issue will be discussed further in Section V. 
In a criminal trial, the judiciary is responsible for ruling in a just way 
on the merits of the case. Federal judges are not coerced into ruling one way 
or the other and do not face pressures from their superiors to rule in a way 
that satisfies a political agenda. State judges are elected and some of their 
decisions may influence their chances at being reelected; however, this does 
not carry the same pressure coming from a superior. Simply put, federal 
judges are impartial. In comparison, immigration judges are at the mercy of 
the Attorney General to get through as many cases as possible to decongest 
the already overwhelmed immigration courts.84 The emphasis is on 
efficiency over justice and ruling on the merits of the case.85 The situation 
often involves an unrepresented alien who has been convicted of a crime 
appearing in front of an immigration judge who faces pressure from the 
Attorney General to expedite cases.86 
This note proposes that the National Association of Immigration 
Judges (NAIJ) seek independence with the creation of an independent court 
system specifically for immigration cases. Though, of course, this is easier 
said than done. The content of this note explains why the immigration 
judiciary would be better off as an independent court. One major reason for 
this call to action is the overbearing, unchecked powers of the executive 
branch. 
                                                           
81 Marouf, supra note 71. 
82 In the Federalist No. 47, James Madison writes about the particular structure of the new 
government and the distribution of power among its different branches: “The accumulation 
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, 
or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
84 Marouf, supra note 71. 
85 Greg Chen, DOJ puts its integrity in doubt by interfering with immigration courts, THE 
HILL, (Feb. 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/484966-doj-puts-its-integrity-
in-doubt-by-interfering-with-immigration-courts [https://perma.cc/2K4M-7K3G].  
86 Joel Rose, Sessions Pushes To Speed Up Immigration Courts, Deportations, NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO, (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/29/597863489/sessions-want-
to-overrule-judges-who-put-deportation-cases-on-hold [https://perma.cc/8T35-ZJUH]. 
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IV. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S INCREASE OF POWER 
A. The Trump Administration’s Attempt at Union Busting 
President Donald Trump’s attempt to further increase the power of 
the executive branch comes at the cost of federal immigration judges. On 
Friday, August 9, 2019, the DOJ filed a petition with the Federal Labor 
Relations Authority to strip the rights of immigration judges to be 
represented by a union.87 The DOJ justifies this by asserting that 
immigration judges are “management officials who formulate and advance 
policy.”88 Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations statute, 
a “management official” cannot be part of a union and is defined as “an 
individual employed by an agency in a position [that] require[s] or 
authorize[s] the individual to formulate, determine, or influence the policies 
of the agency . . . .”89 Judge Ashley Tabaddor, President of the (NAIJ), 
responded to the petition: 
This is nothing more than a desperate attempt by the DOJ to evade 
transparency and accountability, and undermine the decisional 
independence of the nation’s 440 Immigration Judges. We are trial court 
judges who make decisions on the basis of case specific facts and the nation’s 
immigration laws. We do not set policies, and we don’t manage staff.90 
As individual employees of the DOJ, immigration judges cannot speak 
out publicly and are prohibited from lobbying Congress or the DOJ.91 The 
NAIJ is the recognized representative for collective bargaining for all United 
States immigration judges and therefore, is the only avenue by which 
immigration judges can speak independently to voice their interests.92 If this 
                                                           
87 Doc. No. 19081303, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/19081303a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S6C-M585]. 
See also Daniel M. Kowalski, DOJ Attack on Immigration Judges ‘Union Busting Plain and 
Simple,’ LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM, (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/posts/doj-attack-on-
immigration-judges-union-busting-plain-and-simple [https://perma.cc/6J3C-3SR2].  
88 Id. 
89 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(11) (2019). 
90 Richard Gonzales, Trump Administration Seeks Decertification Of Immigration Judges' 
Union, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/12/750656176/trump-administration-seeks-decertification-of-
immigration-judges-union [https://perma.cc/B38S-DC8N]. See also Adam Shaw, Trump 
administration seeks to break up immigration judges’ union, FOX NEWS, (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-administration-looks-to-break-up-immigration-
judges-union [https://perma.cc/2HKF-W6RJ]. 
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attempt by the DOJ to union bust was successful, immigration judges would 
have no practical way to advocate for their interests.93 The DOJ is looking 
for any way to strip immigration judges’ power to unionize, and, by being 
labeled “management officials,” immigration judges would not be 
authorized to form a union.94 The DOJ contends that the role of 
immigration judges is increasing because they are now determining 
immigration policies,95 which would satisfy the “management official” 
requirements of the statute.96 
 The NAIJ was created to represent immigration judges in 1971.97 In 
2000, the NAIJ affiliated with International Federation of Professional and 
Technical Engineers (IFPTE), a larger union representing NASA rocket 
scientists, engineers employed by the U.S. Navy and the Army Corp of 
Engineers, and administrative law judges who hear cases involving Social 
Security claims.98 President of IFPTE, Paul Shearon, also responded to the 
DOJ’s petition on behalf of immigration judges: 
This is nothing more than union busting plain and simple, and part of 
a disturbing pattern. The White House has signed a series of executive 
orders that limit the ability of federal unions to raise questions about abuses 
and inefficiencies, and they have tried to hinder a union’s ability to fully 
represent federal workers who are often stuck in a bureaucratic maze. This 
administration doesn’t want to be held accountable, and they especially 
don’t want anyone looking over their shoulder on immigration issues.99 
Tabaddor and Shearson are explicitly calling out the executive branch 
for abusing its power by trying to “hinder” the NAIJ’s ability to fairly 
represent immigration judges.100 To this point, the NAIJ has long advocated 
for immigration judges to be removed from the DOJ and placed in an 
independent agency much like the bankruptcy and tax courts.101 
 The petition was submitted to the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority, and both sides will have a chance to argue their case. If the 
                                                           
93 Id. 
94 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(11) (2019). 
95 U.S. DOJ, Petition to F.L.R.A. on Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, (Aug. 9, 2019) 
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/19081303a.pdF [https://perma.cc/W76D-GFBF]. See also 
Shaw, supra note 90. 
96 A “management official” is “. . . an individual employed by an agency in a position the 
duties and responsibilities of which require or authorize the individual to formulate, 
determine, or influence the policies of the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(11) (2019). 
97 Shaw, supra note 90. 
98 Kowalski, supra note 86. 
99 Kowalski, supra note 86. 
100 Kowalski, supra note 86. 
101 Kowalski, supra note 86. 
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decertification is successful, the executive branch will gain more power by 
supervising immigration judges’ work schedules, where judges are sent, and 
quotas for the amount of cases each judge should complete.102 Without a 
union, the NAIJ would essentially be stripped of its voice and the ability to 
publicly disagree with the implementation of unfair policies. An example of 
one of these unfair policies comes at the hands of former Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions. 
B. Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ Review Process 
 President Trump’s views on immigration are of no secret to anyone 
due to his drastic, wide-reaching policy changes. In tandem with former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, President Trump sought rapid deportations 
in the adjudication process. Regulations issued by the DOJ give power to 
the Attorney General to review Board cases that are referred to himself, the 
Board, or the Secretary of Homeland Security.103 This review mechanism 
has been widely criticized for good reasons. First, the Attorney General 
power is able to review cases in which he lacks subject matter expertise 
compared to members of the Board.104 Second, he is able to review cases 
without meaningful participation by the parties and without notice to the 
parties.105 These criticisms invoke unfairness to the parties involved, which 
seems from the outset to be a power that should be outside the authority of 
the Attorney General. The administration’s effort to expedite immigration 
cases is a step in the right direction; however, it is going about it in an unjust 
way. 
                                                           
102 Shaw, supra note 90. 
103 The statute reads, in part: 
(1) The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all 
cases that: 
(i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him. 
(ii) The Chairman or a majority of the Board believes should be referred to the 
Attorney General for review. 
(iii) The Secretary of Homeland Security, or specific officials of the Department 
of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary with the concurrence of the 
Attorney General, refers to the Attorney General for review. 
(2) In any case the Attorney General decides, the Attorney General’s decision 
shall be stated in writing and shall be transmitted to the Board or Secretary, as 
appropriate, for transmittal and service as provided in paragraph (f) of this 
section. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2019). 
104 Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. 
REV. 707, 741 (2019). 
105 Id. at 742. 
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 The most relevant criticism for purposes of this note is the Attorney 
General’s decisions based on a political basis rather than on the actual 
merits of the case.106 Indeed, former Attorney General Sessions took full 
advantage of this review process. In his law review article, former Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales writes that “Attorney General referral and review 
is a potent tool through which the executive branch can lawfully advance its 
immigration policy agenda.”107 Former Attorney General Gonzales knows 
first-hand that the power to review immigration cases can be an avenue to 
advance particular political agendas. The attorneys general under both 
Clinton and Obama used this review process a total of seven times over 
eight years; comparatively, Sessions used it four times during his short, 
twenty-one month tenure.108 Former attorneys general most often used the 
review mechanism in situations when cases were referred to by the Board.109 
Sessions, instead, used his own certification process by choosing cases he 
wanted to review and instructing the Board to refer specific cases to him.110 
Specifically, Sessions’ use of the review process stripped the 
procedural rights of parties in immigration proceedings, which some have 
viewed as an attempt to advance policies aligned with President Trump.111 
The four instances when Sessions used his review power (discussed below) 
illustrate this issue. 
 1. Matter of E-F-H-L-112 
In Matter of E-F-H-L-, the respondent applied for asylum and 
withholding of removal.113 The immigration judge denied the application 
because it did not demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief and, 
therefore, determined respondent was not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing.114 The respondent appealed on the merits to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.115 The Board remanded and held that a respondent 
applying for asylum and withholding of removal was “ordinarily entitled to 
                                                           
106 Id. 
107 See Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration 
Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 920 
(2016). 
108 Marouf, supra note 104, at 744. 
109 Marouf, supra note 104, at 744. 
110 Marouf, supra note 104, at 742, 744. 
111 Marouf, supra note 104, at 744. 
112 Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018). 
113 Id. 
114 Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 2014). 
115 E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 226. 
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a full evidentiary hearing.”116 At this point, respondent withdrew his 
application for asylum because he became eligible to legalize his status 
through family-based application, “which provides a much more 
straightforward path to permanent residence.”117 In her law review article on 
the executive branch’s role in immigration adjudication, Professor Fatma E. 
Marouf explains the reasoning for this decision: 
Since the USCIS [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services], not the 
immigration court, has jurisdiction over family-based petitions, the parties 
filed a joint motion to administratively close the removal proceedings, which 
would allow the judge to take the case temporarily off the court’s docket to 
give USCIS time to make a decision. The IJ naturally granted that joint 
motion.118 
The Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals held that 
respondent is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing based on precedent119 and 
federal regulations.120 The regulation states that “[a]pplications for asylum 
and withholding of removal so filed will be decided by the immigration 
judge . . . after an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual issues in dispute.”121 
Sessions then stepped in and used his review process powers to strip 
procedural rights of parties in removal proceedings. He vacated the Board’s 
decision and directed the matter to be calendared and restored to the active 
docket of the Immigration Court.122 In his one-page opinion, Sessions 
reasoned that: 
[b]ecause the application for relief which served as the predicate 
for the evidentiary hearing required by the Board has been 
withdrawn with prejudice, the Board’s decision is effectively 
mooted. I accordingly vacate the decision of the Board in this 
                                                           
116 Id. 
117 Marouf, supra note 104, at 745. 
118 Marouf, supra note 104, at 745. 
119 See Matter of Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 117–18 (A.G. 1989). 
120 Federal regulations state:  
Applications for asylum and withholding of removal so filed will be decided by 
the immigration judge pursuant to the requirements and standards established 
in 8 CFR part 1208 of this chapter after an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual 
issues in dispute. An evidentiary hearing extending beyond issues related to the 
basis for a mandatory denial of the application pursuant to § 1208.14 or § 
1208.16 of this chapter is not necessary once the immigration judge has 
determined that such a denial is required. 
8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3) (2019). 
121 Id. 
122 Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018). 
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matter, and I also direct that this matter be recalendared and 
restored to the active docket of the Immigration Court.123 
Sessions mooted the Board’s decision, going against years of precedent 
and regulated procedural rights for parties in immigration cases.124 
Moreover, Sessions’ remand came with no citing of the federal regulations 
allowing an evidentiary hearing.125 Marouf contends that this decision was 
the first step to narrow the procedural rights of noncitizens and to speed up 
the removal proceedings.126 Why else would Sessions direct the Board to 
refer this particular case to himself, and then rule in a way that goes against 
established law? Sessions was, however, well within his authority as Attorney 
General to intervene and remand any case he wished—and therein lies the 
issue. It is obvious that Matter of E-F-H-L- was not ruled on the merits of 
the case; rather, the decision was made by Sessions with political 
implications in mind. In an effort to expedite removal proceedings, Sessions 
stepped in and ensured that this particular noncitizen would not be granted 
asylum nor withholding of removal. Due to the insurmountable number of 
immigration cases in the docket, Sessions used his review power to decrease 
that number. 
 2. Matter of Castro-Tum127 
 Sessions used his review process for the second time in his decision 
of Matter of Castro-Tum holding that immigration judges and the Board are 
not authorized to administratively close cases.128 Administrative closure is 
when a case is put on hold and removal proceedings are delayed to allow 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to work 
on visa and green card applications of respondents.129 This gives respondents 
(and the USCIS) adequate time to complete the complicated administrative 
requirements necessary to obtain a visa or green card.130 Additionally, 
administrative closure gives respondents a fair opportunity to stay in the 
                                                           
123 Id. 
124 Marouf, supra note 104, at 745. 
125 See E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 226. 
126 Marouf, supra note 104, at 746. 
127 Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018). 
128 Id. at 271. 
129 Louisa Edzie, Matter of Castro-Tum: The Future of Administrative Closures and Due 
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United States without being removed on a technicality regarding their 
paperwork.131 
The court in Matter of Bavakan Avetisyan provides a succinct 
explanation: 
Administrative closure, which is available to an Immigration 
Judge and the Board, is used to temporarily remove a case from 
an Immigration Judge’s active calendar or from the Board’s 
docket. In general, administrative closure may be appropriate to 
await an action or event that is relevant to immigration 
proceedings but is outside the control of the parties or the court 
and may not occur for a significant or undetermined period of 
time.132 
Administrative closure is a fair way of letting things play out that are 
out of the hands of the parties involved. Not only does administrative 
closure help the respondents, but it also helps the immigration judges 
because, for the time being, that particular case is removed from their 
docket and they can tackle the next on the list. 
Sessions, however, appointed himself to the case of Matter of Castro-
Tum133 and reversed years of precedent allowing immigration judges to 
administratively close cases.134 He ruled that “immigration judges and the 
Board may only administratively close a case where a previous regulation or 
a previous judicially approved settlement expressly authorizes such an 
action.”135 In his opinion, Sessions argues that administrative closure 
undermines the ability to “swiftly adjudicate immigration cases” and that 
respondents who fail to appear should be issued deportation orders.136 
Once again, Sessions used his review powers to strip the rights of aliens 
in immigration cases and, in this particular case, the due process rights for 
respondents. In this case specifically, due process rights for respondents.137 
Sessions argues: 
Immigration judges exercise only the authority provided by 
statute or delegated by the Attorney General. Congress has never 
                                                           
131 Id. 
132 Matter of Bavakan Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 692 (B.I.A. 2012) (internal citations 
omitted). 
133 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 281. 
134 Marouf, supra note 104, at 746. 
135 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 271. 
136 Id. at 290. 
137 See The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 17. The report discusses how the 
Attorney General’s office “has abused its controversial certification power in ways that further 
jeopardize asylum seekers’ access to a fair hearing.” The Attorney General’s Judges, supra 
note 50, at 24.  
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authorized administrative closures in a statute, and Department 
of Justice regulations only permit administrative closure in 
specific categories of cases. The Attorney General has never 
delegated the general authority, and I decline to do so now. Cases 
that have been administratively closed absent a specific 
authorizing regulatory provision or judicially approved settlement 
shall be recalendared upon motion of either party. I overrule all 
Board precedents inconsistent with this opinion and remand for 
further proceedings.138 
Despite these comments, immigration judges do hold certain 
independent responsibilities when it comes to determining cases. Federal 
regulations state “immigration judges shall exercise their independent 
judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their 
authorities . . . that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such 
cases.”139 Immigration judges were using their “independent judgement” 
when administratively closing cases in order appropriately adjudicate 
immigration proceedings. Sessions did not like these cases being put on 
hold to be determined later—his goal was to adjudicate and deport as fast as 
possible to clear the decks for quicker decisions.140 Unfortunately, this way 
of stripping due process rights from noncitizens is well within the Attorney 
General’s power. 
 3. Matter of L-A-B-R-141 
 Matter of L-A-B-R- is the third case when Sessions used the review 
process to overturn a case in which he was unhappy with how the Board 
ruled. This case involved evaluating when a continuance is appropriately 
granted. Continuances involve due process and give noncitizens the ability 
to find a representative, obtain evidence, present testimony, and receive a 
decision from the USCIS for a pending visa application that would create a 
path to legal status.142 Federal regulations permit an immigration judge to 
                                                           
138 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 274. 
139 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2019). 
140 In his opinion, Sessions argued that there was: 
. . . no basis for inferring that immigration judges or the Board possess a general 
power to order administrative closure based on some inherent adjudicatory 
authority. The fact that federal district courts employ administrative closure as 
a docket-management tool to temporarily defer adjudication on the merits 
during the pendency of other proceedings does not justify the practice here. 
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 291. 
141 Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018). 
142 Marouf, supra note 104, at 747. 
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“grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.”143 Sessions 
intervened and eventually ordered all future cases involving continuances 
be referred to him for review.144 Sessions questioned the standard for “good 
cause” in continuance cases and eventually narrowed the definition to 
reduce the possibility for continuance motions to be granted.145 
 Sessions agrees that immigration judges “should continue to apply a 
multifactor test to assess whether good cause exists for a continuance for a 
collateral proceeding, but that the decision should turn primarily on the 
likelihood that the collateral relief will be granted and will materially affect 
the outcome of the removal proceedings.”146 This multifactor test had been 
the standard for deciding good cause, but Sessions makes an important 
distinction in Matter of L-A-B-R-. 
 Sessions explicitly provides when a continuance may not be granted: 
“Good cause also may not exist when the alien has not demonstrated 
reasonable diligence in pursuing the collateral adjudication, DHS justifiably 
opposes the motion, or the requested continuance is unreasonably long, 
among other possibilities.”147 Sessions further constricts granting 
continuance by holding that “good cause does not exist if the alien’s visa 
priority date is too remote to raise the prospect of adjustment of status above 
the speculative level.”148 In her article, Marouf points out that this restriction 
vastly affects the number of noncitizens that would be granted a 
continuance.149 She specifically mentions those waiting for family-based visas 
to become available, including spouses of permanent residents and 
unaccompanied minors waiting for the USCIS to make particular 
decisions.150 In some of these situations, all a noncitizen would need is time 
in order to be legally authorized to stay in the country. This is the main point 
of a continuance—to provide noncitizens due process and a ruling on the 
merits of the case. 
 Sessions, however, was more interested in administrative efficiency. 
He instructed immigration judges to consider administrative efficiency when 
deciding whether to grant a continuance because “at bottom, continuances 
                                                           
143 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2019). 
144 “I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals to refer these cases to me for review of its 
decisions. The Board’s decisions in these matters are automatically stayed pending my 
review.” Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 245, 245 (A.G. 2018). 
145  L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 419. 
146 Id. at 412. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 418. 
149 Marouf, supra note 104, at 749. 
150 Marouf, supra note 104, at 749. 
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are themselves intended to promote efficient case management.”151 
However, promoting efficiency over due process puts noncitizens in a much 
more difficult position to receive a fair trial. By not providing parties with 
the time that they need to find a representative, obtain evidence, or present 
testimony, they are not being afforded their due process rights for a fair trial. 
Once again, Sessions used his review process to expedite immigration cases 
in order to decrease the amount of immigration adjudication and increase 
the number of deportations.152 
 4. Matter of A-B-153 
 Matter of A-B- is the final case in which Sessions instructed the 
Board to refer a case to himself. The case discusses when the dismissal of 
asylum claims are appropriate and has increased the amount of asylum 
claims dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.154 Statutory provisions list 
five protected groups for asylum: race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group, or political opinion.155 The category in question in 
Matter of A-B- is membership of a particular group which, according to 
Marouf, is the most difficult to define.156 
 In this case, the respondent claimed she was eligible for asylum 
because she was persecuted for being a member of a particular social group 
of “‘El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic 
relationships where they have children in common’ with their partners.”157 
Respondent shares three children with her ex-husband, and she claims that 
he repeatedly abused her during and after their marriage.158 Upon appeal, 
                                                           
151 L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 416. 
152 Marouf, supra note 104, at 752. 
153 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
154 Marouf, supra note 104, at 752. 
155 The statute reads, in part: 
(A) Safe third country. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney 
General determines that the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement, to a country (other than the country of the alien’s 
nationality or, in the case of an alien having no nationality, the country of the 
alien’s last habitual residence) in which the alien’s life or freedom would not be 
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion, and where the alien would have access to a 
full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent 
temporary protection, unless the Attorney General finds that it is in the public 
interest for the alien to receive asylum in the United States. 
8 U.S.C.S. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2019). 
156 Marouf, supra note 104, at 752. 
157 A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321. 
158 Id. 
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the Board found that respondent’s particular social group was sufficient to 
grant asylum,159 and this is when Sessions assigned the case to himself. 
 In his opinion, Sessions stated that “claims by aliens pertaining to 
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors 
will not qualify for asylum.”160 He goes on to say that “[t]he mere fact that a 
country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as 
domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are more 
likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.”161 
 After Sessions’s decision in A-B-, the USCIS sent out new 
instructions for asylum officers advising them on the impact of the A-B- 
decision on asylum interviews.162 This was an effort to dismiss asylum cases 
even earlier before trial and, therefore, further expedite removal 
proceedings.163 However, these instructions and the determination that 
victims of domestic violence or gang violence will not necessarily qualify for 
asylum were found to be unlawful by the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia in Grace v. Whitaker.164 A group of plaintiffs 
brought action against the Attorney General after their interview for asylum 
was denied. The opinion states that “[a]lthough the asylum officers found 
that plaintiffs’ accounts were sincere, the officers denied their claims after 
applying the standards set forth in a recent precedential immigration 
decision issued by then-Attorney General, Jefferson B. Sessions.”165 The 
court ruled for the plaintiffs, determining that the general rule constructed 
by A-B- is “arbitrary and capricious because there is no legal basis for an 
effective categorical ban on domestic violence and gang-related claims.”166 
                                                           
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 320. 
161 Id. 
162 Marouf, supra note 104, at 754. 
163 Marouf, supra note 104, at 755. 
164 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 127 (2018). In addition to overturning well-settled case law, A-B- 
disrupted a long-term consensus between the government and immigration advocates that 
domestic violence, in certain circumstances, is an appropriate basis for granting asylum. The 
SPLC Southern Poverty Law Center report also discusses this qualification for asylum: 
There has never been a categorical bar against such claims, nor a blanket rule that all claims 
involving domestic violence are valid. Rather, each case has traditionally been assessed on its 
merits, measured against the same general standards applicable to all claims. Reaching 
beyond the facts of the case before him, Sessions held that few claims pertaining to domestic 
or gang violence perpetrated by nongovernmental actors would qualify for asylum—an 
attempt to set forth a new policy that would make the vast majority of claims related to 
domestic violence or gang violence fail “in practice.” 
The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 18.  
165 Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 105. 
166 Id. at 126. 
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 The court references the amendment to immigration laws giving 
aliens with a credible fear of persecution by his or her country of origin the 
opportunity for asylum.167 The entire point was to provide aliens asylum, so 
they would not be subjected to further persecution.168 The court further 
explains Sessions’ errors: 
The general rule is also arbitrary and capricious because it 
impermissibly heightens the standard at the credible fear stage. 
The Attorney General’s direction to deny most domestic violence 
or gang violence claims at the credible fear determination stage is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the threshold screening standard 
that Congress established: an alien’s removal may not be 
expedited if there is a “significant possibility” that the alien could 
establish eligibility for asylum.169 
In A-B-, Sessions went against the intent of Congress in determining 
asylum eligibility for aliens in fear of prosecution. The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia ruled against Sessions in an effort to 
combat the executive branch’s goal of decreasing the number of aliens it lets 
into the United States. 
In all four cases Sessions instructed the Board to refer to himself.170 
Sessions used his power as the Attorney General to review immigration 
cases that did not need reviewing. This type of interference with previously 
adjudicated cases would be less likely to happen if immigration courts were 
Article I courts because biases of the President could no longer be a factor. 
In Matter of A-B-, the plaintiffs were forced to bring legal action to manifest 
their rights as aliens deserving asylum (or at least a fair trial to determine 
whether they were). 
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS—IS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OVERSTEPPING BOUNDARIES? 
A. Separation of Powers Background 
Since the enactment of the constitution, the United States government 
has been based on the separation of powers doctrine. In the Federalist 
Papers 51, James Madison explains why the constitution was written in a 
way that disperses power among three government branches: executive, 
                                                           
167 Id. at 104. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 126–27. 
170 See The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 4, 25–26; Marouf, supra note 103, 
at 746–47, 751, 755. 
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legislative, and judicial.171 Due to the overbearing tyranny of the Crown, the 
new United States drafted its constitution to avoid one particular authority 
reigning tyranny on its citizens. Madison explains that a “partition of power” 
is necessary to avoid “oppression of its rulers.”172 This has been one of the 
cornerstones of democracy since the birth of the country; however, the 
current constitution is not a first draft. Before the constitution as it is written 
today, the Articles of Confederation existed.173 
The Articles of Confederation was a first effort in outlining the 
fundamental principles for the United States, and there was room for 
improvement. For example, the Articles gave the states collective power 
over the federal government, and Congress was the only existing branch of 
government at that time.174 Given there was only one branch of government, 
there certainly was not separation of powers. Congress’s powers were 
limited; it had the ability to go to war, but there was no money to do so 
because it was unable to tax the states.175 The states’ “league of friendship” 
in accordance with the limited powers of Congress proved to be 
fundamental principles that a country could not be built upon.176 
                                                           
171 James Madison describes how the separated powers government can thrive:  
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the 
different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all 
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each 
department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so 
constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in 
the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously 
adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, 
legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain 
of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever 
with one another. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
172 Id. 
173 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781. 
174 The relevant articles are quoted below: 
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to 
the United States, in Congress assembled. 
Id. at art. II. 
The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each 
other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual 
and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force 
offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, 
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever. 
Id. at art. III.  
175 Id. art. VIII, para. 2. 
176 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for 
Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 401–
28
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss4/2
986 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:4 
 
As a result, the United States Constitution was written and divided the 
country’s power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 
Article I details the powers of the legislative branch, Article II the executive 
branch, and Article III the judicial branch. The branches are framed in a 
way so they are accountable to each other, and each branch depends on the 
people—the true source of authority.177 Madison argues that the challenge in 
running a government is enabling the government to control the governed 
and then enabling it to control itself.178 The government is able to control 
itself through the separation of powers because not one government entity 
will wield enough power to overstep its bounds. Madison writes that in the 
federal republic of the United States “. . . all authority in it will be derived 
from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so 
many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or 
of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the 
majority.”179 This type of government functions when the separation of 
powers aims to protect the justice of its citizens, because “[i]n a society under 
the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the 
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where 
the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger.”180 
 The constitution was written to give power to the people by limiting 
the power of the government. To keep a particular branch of the 
government going beyond its power enumerated by the constitution, the 
other branches may provide accountability or a system of checks and 
                                                           
03 (2017) (“Although the Articles of Confederation did not remain in effect for a long period, 
experience under the Articles paved the way for creating the far more enduring Constitution 
. . . . [T]he influence of the Articles of Confederation remains discernable to this day.”). 
177 Madison writes: 
     The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of 
the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be 
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, 
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external 
nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty 
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and 
in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
     A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the 
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions. 
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balances.181 For example, the president has the ability to veto laws made by 
Congress in order to keep the legislative branch in check.182 However, 
Congress can override the president’s veto with a two-thirds vote from the 
House of Representatives, which balances out the president’s power.183 This 
type of accountability is particularly difficult, however, when the branch is 
statutorily authorized to act in a way that should be addressed by a different 
branch. 
 As discussed above, under the Code of Federal Regulation, the 
Attorney General of the United States appoints immigration judges “to 
conduct specified classes of proceedings . . . [and] act as the Attorney 
General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.”184 “[I]mmigration 
judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to them by the Act 
and by the Attorney General through regulation.”185 As the regulations state, 
immigration judges are subject to the authority of the Attorney General 
when deciding cases. These regulations give the executive branch an 
advantage regarding power and, as a result, strip necessary powers from what 
should be the judicial or legislative branch. The cases cited in Section IV 
provide instances when the executive branch overstepped its bounds and, 
ultimately, stripped justice from the parties involved.186 This section analyzes 
how and why this power wielded by the executive branch is unconstitutional. 
B.  Powers of the Executive Branch 
 The executive branch holds both enumerated and implied 
constitutional powers. Article II of the Constitution explicitly lists the 
powers of the President including appointing him or her “Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”187 and “Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . and . . . 
shall appoint Ambassadors.”188 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
                                                           
181 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding an act of congress unconstitutional); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (limiting the power of the 
President to seize private property). 
182 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
183 Id. 
184 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (2009). 
185 Id. at (b). 
186 See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); Matter of 
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
187 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
188 Id. 
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Corp., the Supreme Court interprets the constitutional language to 
determine that the President has broad authority to control foreign affairs.189 
It seems immigration issues fall directly under the category of foreign 
affairs and, therefore, the executive branch seemingly has direct power over 
immigration. However, the legislative branch has a similar argument. Article 
I of the Constitution authorizes congress “[t]o establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization,”190 “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations,”191 “[t]o 
declare war,”192 and prohibit “[t]he migration or importation of such persons 
as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit.”193 The 
Constitution, therefore, establishes immigration power in both political 
branches of the United States government. 
Despite the executive branch’s constitutional powers over immigration, 
the President has historically exercised restraint when dealing with 
adjudication.194 In her law review article, Professor Marouf argues that 
presidential interference in proceedings leads to problems in administrative 
adjudication.195 Before she assumed her duties as an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Elena Kagan emphasized this point by 
distinguishing that procedural requirements are stricter when an agency acts 
through adjudication rather than the rulemaking process.196 She argues that 
participation in adjudicative proceedings belongs to the affected parties to 
“ensure[] fundamental fairness and protection against abuse,” and “[i]n this 
context, presidential participation in administration, of whatever form, 
would contravene procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence 
into the resolution of controversies.”197 
                                                           
189 Quoting Justice Sutherland: 
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an 
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with 
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be 
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936). 
190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
191 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
192 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
193 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
194 Marouf, supra note 104, at 723. 
195 Id. 
196 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2362 (2001). 
197 Id. at 2362–63. 
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This argument should also be applied to immigration cases. Indeed, 
as seen in the cases discussed in Section IV,198 President Trump’s 
involvement and policy goals served (and continue to serve) as an 
“inappropriate influence” in resolving immigration proceedings.199 This 
influence in no way promotes the goals of adjudication, and the judiciary is 
beginning to fight back against these injustices. 
C.  Relevant Case Law 
 1. Romero v. Barr200 
 Prior to the ruling in Romero v. Barr in August 2019, an immigration 
judge denied the administrative closure201 of Jesus Zuniga Romero’s original 
case.202 Romero, a Honduran citizen, petitioned the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) for review, but eventually the appeal was dismissed due to 
the precedential decision of Matter of Castro-Tum.203 In Castro-Tum, 
                                                           
198 See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); Matter of 
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
199 Kagan, supra note 195, at 2362. 
200 Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019). 
201 If not for the denial, Romero’s case would have been removed from the immigration 
judge’s docket, which seemingly, was the intent of the attorney general. Id. at 286. 
202 In 2013, “the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against 
Romero” for being in the United States illegally. Id. at 286. Romero accepted a grant of 
voluntary departure but eventually reopened the case because the immigration judge 
determined he “was a beneficiary of a pending Form I-130 filed by his wife, who was then a 
lawful permanent resident (“LPR”).” Id. Judge G. Steven Agee describes the ensuing events 
in the proceeding: 
After the I-130 had been approved, Romero filed a motion for administrative 
closure, advising that his wife had since become a naturalized U.S. citizen and 
that he wished to file a Form I-601A for a provisional unlawful presence waiver. 
In order to file the Form, the removal proceedings had to be administratively 
closed . . . . [A]dministrative closure is a procedural mechanism primarily 
employed for the convenience of the adjudicator (namely, IJs and the BIA) in 
order to allow cases to be removed from the active dockets of immigration 
courts, often so that individuals can pursue alternate immigration remedies—
such as, in Romero’s case, pursuing a provisional unlawful presence waiver. 
Romero advised that if his case were administratively closed, then once the 
waiver had been approved, he intended to move to re-calendar and terminate 
removal proceedings so that he could then go through the consular process in 
Honduras. 
Id. at 286–87 (quoting Judge G. Steven Agee). 
203 Initially, the BIA granted Romero’s appeal and administratively closed the case; however, 
this decision was dismissed later due to the decision in Matter of Castro-Tum. Id. (citing 
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018)). 
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discussed in detail in Section IV, the Attorney General ruled that 
immigration judges and the BIA do not have authority to administratively 
close cases.204 
 Romero’s wife became a naturalized United States citizen, and in 
order for Romero to gain legal access into the country, he needed the 
removal proceedings to be administratively closed.205 But for the Attorney 
General’s interference in Matter of Castro-Tum, Romero would have 
successfully administratively closed his removal proceedings case and 
would, therefore, have received legal access in the United States. Once 
again, immigration judges are being stripped of their powers as adjudicators 
to try cases on the merits rather than by influence (or interference) of the 
executive branch. 
 Romero petitioned the BIA decision for review with the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.206 Ultimately, the court 
rejected the Attorney General’s ruling that immigration judges do not have 
authority to administratively close cases.207 This argument derives from his 
interpretation of specific federal regulations outlining the powers and duties 
of the BIA and immigration judges.208 According to Attorney General 
                                                           
204 Quoting the Attorney General’s ruling: 
Immigration judges and the Board have come to rely upon administrative 
closure without thoroughly explaining their authority to do so. Unlike the power 
to grant continuances, which the regulations expressly confer, immigration 
judges and the Board lack a general authority to grant administrative closure. 
No Attorney General has delegated such broad authority, and legal or policy 
arguments do not justify it. I therefore hold that immigration judges and the 
Board lack this authority except where a previous regulation or settlement 
agreement has expressly conferred it. 
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 281. 
205 Romero, 937 F.3d at 286. 
206 Id. at 287. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2019):  
A petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance 
with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an 
order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act. . . 
207 Romero, 937 F.3d at 292. 
208 The relevant regulations specifying the powers and duties of the BIA and immigration 
judges are quoted below: 
(b) Powers and duties. In conducting hearings under section 240 of the Act and 
such other proceedings the Attorney General may assign to them, immigration 
judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to them by the Act and by 
the Attorney General through regulation. In deciding the individual cases before 
them, and subject to the applicable governing standards, immigration judges 
shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any 
action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is 
appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases. Immigration judges 
shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-
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Sessions, “. . . neither section . . . confers the authority to grant 
administrative closure. Grants of general authority to take measures 
‘appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases’ would not 
ordinarily include the authority to suspend such cases indefinitely.”209 
 The Fourth Circuit disagrees with this contention.210 The court 
comes to the conclusion that the plain language of the federal regulations “. 
. . unambiguously confers upon [immigration judges] and the BIA the 
general authority to administratively close cases. . .”—the exact opposite 
interpretation of the Attorney General.211 The court uses the standard tools 
of interpretation to discern the text of the regulations—specifically focusing 
on how both regulations grant immigration judges and the BIA the power 
to “take any action . . . appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the 
case.”212 The court criticizes the Attorney General’s decision to disallow 
immigration judges and the BIA to employ administrative closures—a 
mechanism that has been used and consistently reaffirmed since the late 
1980s.213 Judge Agee argues that “. . . numerous petitioners have relied on 
this long-established procedural mechanism to proceed through the 
                                                           
examine aliens and any witnesses. Subject to §§ 1003.35 and 1287.4 of this 
chapter, they may issue administrative subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses 
and the presentation of evidence. In all cases, immigration judges shall seek to 
resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial manner consistent 
with the Act and regulations. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2019). 
(d) Powers of the Board—(1) Generally. The Board shall function as an appellate 
body charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the 
Act that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it. The Board shall 
resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely, impartial, and 
consistent with the Act and regulations. In addition, the Board, through 
precedent decisions, shall provide clear and uniform guidance to the Service, 
the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and 
administration of the Act and its implementing regulations. 
(ii) Subject to these governing standards, Board members shall exercise their 
independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases 
coming before the Board, and a panel or Board member to whom a case is 
assigned may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and 
the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(d)(1)(ii). 
209 Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 284. Attorney General Sessions further contends 
that the provisions set out in the federal regulations “direct immigration judges or the Board 
to resolve matters ‘in a timely fashion’—another requirement that conflicts with a general 
suspension of authority.” Id.  
210 Romero, 937 F.3d at 292. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)). 
213 Id. at 296. 
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immigration process. To suddenly change this interpretation of the 
regulation undermines the significant reliance interests such petitioners have 
developed.”214 
 The Castro-Tum decision being vacated by Romero v. Barr brings 
three major points to light.215 First, the decision manifests the already 
obvious efforts of the executive branch to fulfill its immigration policy goals 
by stripping power from immigration judges. It has been apparent that 
President Donald Trump wants to use the immigration courts as a means 
of enforcing and increasing deportation.216 The unprecedented interference 
of the Attorney General in a case stripping the power of immigration judges 
to administratively close cases is a clear abuse of power and an obvious 
attempt to halt the just proceedings of Romero. 
Second, the fact that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit vacated the decision by the Attorney General provides support that 
the Attorney General was overstepping his bounds. The court calls the 
decision in Castro-Tum “internally inconsistent” and holds that federal 
regulations “unambiguously confer upon [immigration judges] and the BIA 
the general authority to administratively close cases . . . .”217 It is a relief that 
the federal courts stepped in to vacate a decision that was clearly not ruled 
on the merits of the case in an attempt to provide due process. In this 
instance, the federal courts also kept the Attorney General in check in order 
to avoid injustice. 
 Third, Romeo v. Barr emphasizes the need for immigration judges 
to become their own independent court. If this were already the case—with 
no pressure from the executive branch—the immigration courts would have 
ruled in the same way as the federal courts. In Castro-Tum, the immigration 
judge administratively closed the case in order to ensure the address for the 
respondent was correct so that the Notice to Appear was being sent to the 
right place.218 However, as discussed above, Sessions appointed himself to 
                                                           
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 286. 
216 The Southern Poverty Law Center describes this type of power as a weapon that: 
. . . has taken many forms, including the recasting of judges as enforcement 
officers; the encouragement of bias against asylum seekers and their counsel; 
the imposition of case quotas, which destroy impartiality by threatening judges’ 
job security; the politicization of immigration judge hiring and firing; and the 
aggressive use of the certification power to eliminate important docket 
management tools and encourage the prejudgment of cases. 
The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 18.  
217 Romero, 937 F.3d at 294–97. 
218 After the respondent failed to appear to five hearings, the immigration judge stated that he 
did not view the “addresses as reliable and would not proceed . . .” and administratively 
closed the case. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 279 (A.G. 2018). 
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the case and reversed years of precedent allowing immigration judges to 
administratively close cases.219 But for the Attorney General’s interference, 
the case would have proceeded with the administrative closure. Given the 
ruling in Romeo v. Barr, Castro-Tum should have proceeded with the 
administrative closure because the decision gives this general authority back 
to immigration judges.220 If immigration judges were in their own 
independent court, it would have saved the court’s time and resources in 
ruling on a decision that was already made. In this case, the Attorney 
General complicated the matter. No longer should the Attorney General 
use immigration judges as tools for enforcing deportation—they should 
simply be independent adjudicators. 
VI. THE NEED FOR THE IMMIGRATION JUDICIARY’S INDEPENDENCE 
A. Why the Need for Separation? 
 It has come to the breaking point. The immigration court system is 
no longer a place where cases can be adjudicated in a way that is consistent 
with the Constitution.221 Immigrants are no longer receiving their procedural 
due process rights as laid out in the Constitution and as a result, immigrants 
seeking asylum are suffering at the hands of the President. The Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution extends due process rights to 
all people within the United States jurisdiction by stating that “[n]o person 
shall be . . . without due process of law . . . .”222 It may be obvious, but in 
order for asylum to be granted, one must first appear in court. But without 
their constitutional due process rights, asylum seekers will be turned away 
                                                           
219 Id. at 271. 
220 Id. at 292. 
221 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); see also 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all 
‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is 
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). It is also relevant to quote, in full, the Fifth 
Amendment:  
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
222 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
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only to return to the suffering that forced them to leave their country of 
origin in the first place. 
 In an article written by Julia Preston, Jeremey McKinney, vice-
president of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, is quoted 
saying “[i]t’s time for the Department of Justice and the immigration courts 
to get a divorce.”223 In July, the immigration lawyers joined with the 
American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Association, and the National 
Association of Immigration Judges in writing a letter to Congress asking to 
be “establish[ed] as an independent court system that can guarantee a fair 
day in court.”224 The article notes that this idea was percolating in the 
Democratic presidential contests, with three former candidates—Julián 
Castro, Beto O’Rourke, and Senator Elizabeth Warren—presenting specific 
plans. Another former candidate, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, drafted a bill 
last year to make the change.”225 
 This notion has support and is within reach as long as Congress still 
considers it. Resolving the immigration courts crisis would bring the balance 
of power back to the branches of the government. Immigration judges 
would no longer adhere to the desires of the President; no longer would 
they have to meet a specific quota of finishing cases in order to keep their 
jobs.226 They would simply rule on the merits of the case. 
                                                           
223 Julia Preston, Is It Time to Remove Immigration Courts From Presidential Control?, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/08/28/is-it-time-to-remove-immigration-courts-
from-presidential-control [https://perma.cc/L9UM-QTVJ]. 
224 Id. The proposal would allow “the immigration courts [to] become a stand-alone agency 
that would not be run or controlled by outside officials, with the goal of insulating judges 
from political pressure by any administration.” Id. 
225 Id. Preston’s article also notes that chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Rep. 
Jerrold Nadler, a Democrat from New York, indicated that he will eventually be holding 
hearings on the proposals. Id. 
226 Id. One major cause of disruption among immigration judges was the need to fulfill a quota 
of cases in order to expedite removal proceedings. Since October 2018, judges were required 
to complete 700 cases a year with no more than fifteen percent of decisions being remanded 
by appeals courts. In addition, time restrictions were set in place for some decisions. “To 
remind judges of their standing, Justice officials designed a speedometer that sits on judges’ 
computer screens, with green marking numbers of decisions that meet the metrics and 
stoplight red indicating where they are lagging.” Id.  
Denise Noonan Slavin, a retired immigration judge, recalled seeing the dashboard: “So you 
sit down and you see that dashboard staring at you, updated every day, and you have 50 
motions on your desk to decide whether to continue a case. If judges get into that red, they 
can lose their job.” Id. 
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B. How Separation Would Work 
 This note mostly explores the reasons why the immigration courts 
need independence from the executive branch and the Attorney General, 
but it is important to outline how (if it all) this would be possible. Preston’s 
article indicates that “[m]ost proposals to reconfigure the courts would have 
Congress act under Article I of the Constitution.”227 The United States 
federal courts include the courts under Article III of the Constitution, and 
the adjudicative entities established by Congress under its Article I legislative 
powers.228 Congress has created several of these Article I courts using its 
Constitutional power, like tax and bankruptcy courts.229 The Federal Bar 
Association has drafted proposed legislation to create such a court, because 
there is a consensus that the immigration court system is broken.230 It is up 
to Congress whether it wants to reconfigure the immigration courts to 
become an Article I court, and all anyone else can do is continue to make 
                                                           
227 Proposals to reconfigure the immigration courts as a separate agency still within the 
executive branch have been compared to the tax court that was set up in 1969 “to have 
independent judges deciding federal tax disputes, taking them out of the grip of the Internal 
Revenue Service.” Id. 
The type of bill would be “drafted ‘with the idea of simply lifting the courts,’ and their budget, 
out of the Justice Department, said Elizabeth Stevens, chair of the organization’s immigration 
law section. Under this plan, the courts would remain in existing facilities and current judges 
would continue to serve for four years before being re-appointed by Senate-confirmed 
appeals judges to serve in the new system.” Id. 
228 Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, supra note 2. 
The adjudicative entities established by Congress are authorized under Article I of the 
Constitution: “To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 9. 
229 The Federal Judicial Center distinguishes between Article I and Article III judges: 
Operating under its Article I, section 8 power to “constitute” federal tribunals, 
Congress has created several courts staffed by judges holding these protections 
who exercise the “judicial power” contemplated in Article III. These courts are 
commonly known as “Article III” or “constitutional” courts. The latter moniker 
can be confusing, as the Constitution does not oblige Congress to create any 
particular court and such courts routinely hear non-constitutional disputes. 
. . . . 
 Since the earliest days of the republic, Congress has also created separate 
“Article I” or “legislative” courts. Again, the nomenclature can be confusing as 
Article I does not specifically authorize these courts and they do not “legislate” 
in any traditional sense of the word. These courts range from independent 
federal tribunals staffed with judges who are not subject to the tenure and salary 
protection of Article III . . . . Unlike other Article I judges (including 
bankruptcy, territorial and magistrate judges), for example, they are not 
administered by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts or 
governed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
Courts: A Brief Overview, supra note 1. 
230 Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, supra note 2.  
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Congress aware of the injustices that immigration parties endure under the 
authority of the executive branch. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Injustice resides in the immigration courts. The executive branch 
continues to turn their backs on asylum seekers and their families, causing 
them to return to unsafe country conditions. Aliens seek asylum because 
they are in danger. For some, entering the country illegally may be their only 
option, but that does not mean a country should turn them away. The 
United States was founded on inclusion and diversity and a way to flee a 
tyrannical environment that had become oppressing and, in some cases, 
dangerous. The framers of the Constitution created due process for a 
reason, and it belongs to everyone. 
 The executive branch should no longer be in control of the 
immigration courts because it has abused its power for too long. This was 
painfully apparent during former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ attempt at 
reviewing cases he simply assigned to himself. This type of power does not 
promote justice, due process, or democracy. President Trump is able to 
force his political agenda on immigration judges in order to receive 
decisions that are satisfactory to him. A court that has become politicized is 
no court at all. 
 Congress needs to create legislation to make the immigration courts 
an Article I court. The court would be overseen by judges themselves and 
would eliminate the interference of the Attorney General and the President. 
Due process would be restored and, so too, would the immigration judiciary 
system. 
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